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Abstract
In multi-hop wireless networks, every node is expected to forward packets for the benefit of
other nodes. Yet, if each node is its own authority, then it may selfishly deny packet forwarding
in order to save its own resources. Some researchers have proposed to introduce an incentive
mechanism in the network that motivates the nodes to cooperate. In this paper, we address the
question of whether such an incentive mechanism is necessary or cooperation between the nodes
exists in the absence of it. We define a model in a game theoretic framework and identify the con-
ditions under which cooperative strategies can form an equilibrium. As the problem is somewhat
involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration.
1 Introduction
By definition, in multi-hop wireless networks, every node is expected to forward packets for the benefit
of other nodes. This is probably the most important difference of this family of networks with respect
to those that are more conventional, such as the Internet or cellular networks.
As long as the whole network is under the control of a single authority, as is usually the case in
military networks or for rescue operations, this situation is not problematic because the interest of the
mission by far exceeds the vested interest of each participant. However, if each node is its own au-
thority, the situation changes dramatically: In this case, the most reasonable assumption is to consider
that each node will try to maximize its benefits by exploiting the network, even if this means adopt-
ing a selfish behavior. This selfishness can mean not participating in the unfolding of mechanisms
of common interest (e.g., route setup, packet forwarding, or mobility management), notably to spare
resources, including batteries.
∗The work presented in this paper was supported (in part) by the National Competence Center in Research on Mobile
Information and Communication Systems (NCCR-MICS), a center supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation
under grant number 5005-67322 (http://www.terminodes.org)
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Over the last few years, several researchers have proposed incentive techniques to encourage nodes
to collaborate, be it by circumventing misbehaving nodes [MGLB00], by making use of a reputation
system [BL02], or by relating the right to benefit from the network to the sense of the common interest
demonstrated so far [BH03]. To the best of our knowledge the only paper that focuses on cooperation
conditions without any incentive mechanism is [SNCR03], where the authors build up a theoretical
framework based on different energy classes.
In this paper, we study the problem of cooperation for the most basic mechanism, namely packet
forwarding. In order to do so, we define a model in a game theoretic framework and identify the
conditions under which an equilibrium based on cooperation exists. As the problem is somewhat
involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we show how packet
forwarding can be modelled in a game theoretic framework. In Section 3, we analyze the model
introduced in Section 2. We provide our main results, stated as theorems in Section 4 along with
our simulation results. In Section 5, we present the related work. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 6.
2 Modelling packet forwarding as a game
Connectivity graph. Let us consider an ad hoc network of n nodes. Let us denote the set of all nodes
by N . Each node has a given power range and two nodes are said to be neighbors if they reside
within the power range of each other. We represent the neighbor relationship between the nodes
with an undirected graph, which we call the connectivity graph. Each vertex of the connectivity graph
corresponds to a node in the network, and two vertices are connected with an edge if the corresponding
nodes are neighbors.
Routes. Communication between two non-neighboring nodes is based on multi-hop relaying. This
means that packets from the source to the destination are forwarded by intermediate nodes. Such a
chain of nodes (including the source and the destination) is represented by a path in the connectivity
graph, which we call a route. We assume that one of the shortest paths is chosen randomly as a route
for each source-destination pair and it remains the same for the entire duration of the game.
Time. We use a discrete model of time where time is divided into slots. We assume that both
the connectivity graph and the set of existing routes remain unchanged during a time slot, whereas
changes may happen at the end of each time slot. We assume that the duration of the time slot is much
longer than the time of a packet relaying from the source to the destination. This means that a node is
able to send several packets within one time slot.
Forwarding game. We model the packet forwarding operation as a game, which we call the
forwarding game. The players of the forwarding game are the nodes. In each time slot t, each node i
chooses a cooperation level pi(t) ∈ [0, 1], where 0 and 1 represent full defection and full cooperation,
respectively. Here, defection means that the node does not forward traffic for the benefit of other
nodes and cooperation means that it does. Thus, pi(t) represents the fraction of the traffic routed
through i in t that i actually forwards. Note that i has a single cooperation level pi(t) that it applies
to every route in which it is involved as a forwarder. We preferred not to require the nodes to be
able to distinguish the packets that belong to different routes, because this would require identifying
the source-destination pairs and applying a different cooperation level to each of them. This would
probably increase the computation significantly.
Let us assume that in time slot t there exists a route r with source node s and ` intermediate nodes
f1, f2, . . . , f`. The normalized value of the throughput τ(r, t) experienced by the source s on r in t is
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defined as the fraction of the traffic sent by s on r in t that is delivered to the destination. Since we are
studying cooperation in packet forwarding, we assume that the main reason for dropping packets in
the network is the non-cooperative behavior of the nodes. In other words, we assume that the network
is not congested and that the number of packets dropped because of the limited capacity of the nodes
and the links is negligible. Hence, τ(r, t) can be computed as the product of the cooperation levels of
all intermediate nodes:
τ(r, t) =
∏`
k=1
pfk(t) (1)
The payoff ξs(r, t) of s on r in t depends on the normalized throughput τ(r, t). In general, ξs(r, t) =
u(τ(r, t)), where u is some non-decreasing function. In this paper, we assume that u is linear and has
the following form: u(x) = (G+ L) · x− L = G · x− L · (1− x), where G = u(1) > 0 represents
the gain that s obtains if all its traffic sent on r in t is delivered to the destination, and−L = u(0) < 0
represents the loss that s suffers if nothing is delivered in t to the destination. Thus, we get that
ξi(r, t) = (G+ L) · τ(r, t)− L (2)
For simplicity, we assume that every node in the network uses the same function u and the same
parameters G and L, which we assume to be independent of r and t.
The payoff ηfj (r, t) of the j-th intermediate node fj on r in t is non-positive and represents the
cost for node fj to forward packets on route r during time slot t. It depends on the fraction τj(r, t)
of the traffic sent by the source on r in t that is forwarded by fj . The value τj(r, t) is the normalized
throughput on r in t leaving node j, and it is computed as the product of the cooperation levels of the
intermediate nodes from f1 up to and including fj :
τj(r, t) =
j∏
k=1
pfk(t) (3)
Let −C < 0 represent the forwarding cost for the first forwarder if it forwards all the traffic sent by
the source on r in t. The payoff ηfj (r, t) of the j-th intermediate node is then defined as follows:
ηfj (r, t) = −C · τj(r, t) (4)
Again, for simplicity, we assume that forwarding one unit of traffic costs the same for every node in
the network and that the parameter C is independent from r and t.
By definition, the payoff of the destination is 0. In other words, we assume that only the source
has a benefit if the traffic reaches the destination (information pushing). We note however, that our
model can be applied and all of our results hold in the reverse case when only the destination benefits
from receiving traffic; an example for this scenario would be a file download.
The total payoff pii(t) of node i in time slot t is then computed as
pii(t) =
∑
r∈Si(t)
ξi(r, t) +
∑
r∈Fi(t)
ηi(r, t) (5)
where Si(t) is the set of routes in t where i is source, and Fi(t) is the set of routes in t where i is an
intermediate node.
Strategy space. In every time slot, each node i updates its cooperation level using a strategy
function σi. In general, i could choose a cooperation level to be used in time slot t based on the
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information it obtained in all preceding time slots. In order to make the analysis feasible, we assume
that i uses only information that it obtained in the previous time slot. More specifically, we assume
that i chooses its cooperation level in time slot t based on the normalized throughput it experienced in
time slot t− 1 on the routes where it was a source. Formally:
pi(t) = σi([τ(r, t− 1)]r∈Si(t−1)) (6)
where [τ(r, t− 1)]r∈Si(t−1) represents the normalized throughput vector for node i in time slot t− 1,
each element of which being the normalized throughput experienced by i on a route where it was
source in t − 1. The strategy of a node i is then defined by its strategy function σi and its initial
cooperation level pi(0).
Note that σi takes as input the normalized throughput and not the total payoff received by i in the
previous time slot. The rationale is that i should react to the behavior of the rest of the network, which
is represented by the normalized throughput in our model.
There are an infinite number of strategy functions; we highlight three special cases (in Table 1) that
we will encounter later in the analysis [Axe84]. If the output of the strategy function is independent
of the input, then the strategy is called a non-reactive strategy (e.g., always defecting and always
cooperating in Table 1). If the output depends on the input, then the strategy is reactive (e.g., Tit-For-
Tat in Table 1).
Table 1: Three special strategies. Here, we assume that σi takes as input a one dimensional vector
(i.e., a scalar)
Strategy Initial move Function
AllD (always defect) 0 σi(x) = 0
AllC (always cooperate) 1 σi(x) = 1
TFT (Tit-For-Tat) 1 σi(x) = x
Our model requires that each source be able to observe the throughput in a given time slot on
every route. We assume that this is made possible with high enough precision by using some higher
level control protocol above the network layer.
3 Meta-model
In this section, we introduce a meta-model in order to formalize the properties of the packet forwarding
game defined in the previous section. Thus, we study the behavior of the model through the analysis
of the meta-model (i.e., a model of the model). Unlike in the model presented in the previous section,
in the meta-model and in the rest of the paper, we will assume that routes remain unchanged during
the lifetime of the network. In addition, we also assume that each node is a source on only one route.
Dependency graph. Let us consider a route r. The normalized throughput experienced (hence
the payoff received) by the source on r depends on the cooperation levels of the intermediate nodes
on r. We represent this dependency relation between the nodes with a directed graph, which we call
the dependency graph. Each vertex of the dependency graph corresponds to a network node. There
is a directed edge from vertex i to vertex j, denoted by the ordered pair (i, j), if there exists a route
where i is an intermediate node and j is the source. Intuitively, an edge (i, j) means that the behavior
(cooperation level) of i has an effect on j. The concept of dependency graph is illustrated in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: Example of dependency graph In (a), the arrows represent the routes (e.g., there is a route
between nodes 1 and 4 passing through nodes 6 and 5). The corresponding dependency graph is
shown in (b)
Game automaton. Now we define the automaton A that will model the unfolding of the forward-
ing game. The automaton is built on the dependency graph. We assign a machine Mi to every vertex
i of the dependency graph and interpret the edges of the dependency graph as links that connect the
machines assigned to the vertices. Each machineMi thus has some input and some (possibly 0) output
links.
The internal structure of the machine is illustrated in Fig. 2. Each machine Mi consists of a
multiplication gate
∏
followed by a gate that implements the strategy function σi of node i. The
multiplication gate
∏
takes the values on the input1 links and passes their product to the strategy
function gate2. Finally, the output of the strategy function gate is passed to each output link of Mi.
Π
σi
Mi
...
...
Figure 2: Internal structure of machine Mi
The automaton A works in discrete steps. Initially, in step 0, each machine Mi outputs some
initial value xi(0). Then, in step t > 0, each machine computes its output xi(t) by taking the values
that appear on its input links in step t− 1.
1The multiplication comes from the fact that the experienced throughput for the source is the product of the cooperation
levels of the forwarders on its route.
2Note that here σi takes a single real number as input, instead of a vector of real numbers as we defined earlier, because
we assume that each node is source on only one route.
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Figure 3: The automaton that corresponds to the dependency graph of Fig. 1
Formally, the operation of A can be described by a set of equations, where each equation cor-
responds to a machine Mi. As an example, let us consider the automaton in Fig. 3, which is the
automaton that corresponds to the dependency graph of Fig. 1. Its operation is described by the fol-
lowing set of equations:
x1(t) = σ1(x5(t− 1) · x6(t− 1))
x2(t) = σ2(x1(t− 1))
x3(t) = σ3(x4(t− 1))
x4(t) = σ4(x2(t− 1) · x3(t− 1))
x5(t) = σ5(x4(t− 1))
x6(t) = σ6(x1(t− 1))
It is easy to see that by iteratively substituting the appropriate equations into each other, the value of
any output in any step can be expressed as a function of the initial values xi(0). For instance:
x1(3) = σ1(x5(2) · x6(2))
= σ1(σ5(x4(1)) · σ6(x1(1)))
= σ1(σ5(σ4(x2(0) · x3(0))) · σ6(σ1(x5(0) · x6(0))))
Note that if xi(0) = pi(0) for all i, then in step t, each machine Mi will output the cooperation
level of node i in time slot t (i.e., xi(t) = pi(t)), as we assumed that the set of routes (and hence
the dependency graph) remains unchanged in every time slot. Therefore, the evolution of the values
on the output links of the machines (which, in fact, represent the state of the automaton) models the
evolution of the cooperation levels of the nodes in the network. It also follows that the cooperation
level pi(t) of any node i in any time slot t can be expressed as a function of the initial cooperation
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levels of the nodes. For instance:
p1(3) = x1(3)
= σ1(σ5(σ4(x2(0) · x3(0))) · σ6(σ1(x5(0) · x6(0))))
= σ1(σ5(σ4(p2(0) · p3(0))) · σ6(σ1(p5(0) · p6(0))))
In order to study the interaction of node i with the rest of the network, we extract the gate that
implements the strategy function σi from the automaton A. What remains is the automaton without
σi, which we denote by A−i. A−i has an input and an output link; if we connect these to the output
and the input, respectively, of σi (as illustrated in Fig. 4) then we get back the original automaton A.
In other words, the automaton in Fig. 4 is another representation of the automaton in Fig. 3, which
captures the fact that from the viewpoint of node i, the rest of the network behaves like an automaton:
The input of A−i is the sequence xi = xi(0), xi(1), . . . of the cooperation levels of i, and its output is
the sequence yi = yi(0), yi(1), . . . of the normalized throughput values for i.
σiA-i
xi
yi
Figure 4: Model of interaction between node i and the rest of the network represented by the automa-
ton A−i
By using the system of equations that describe the operation of A, one can easily express any
element yi(t) of sequence yi as some function of the preceding elements xi(t−1), xi(t−2), . . . , xi(0)
of sequence xi and the initial values xj(0) (j 6= i) of the machines within A−i. We call such an
expression of yi(t) the t-th input/output formula or shortly the t-th i/o formula of A−i. It is important
to note that the i/o formulae of A−i may involve any strategy function σj where j 6= i, but they never
involve σi. Taking the automaton of Fig. 3 again, and extracting, for instance, σ6, we can determine
the first few i/o formulae of A−6 as follows:
y6(0) = x1(0)
y6(1) = σ1(x5(0) · x6(0))
y6(2) = σ1(σ5(x4(0)) · x6(1))
y6(3) = σ1(σ5(σ4(x2(0) · x3(0))) · x6(2))
. . . . . .
Dependency loops. Node i has a dependency loop if there exists a sequence
(i, v1), (v1, v2), . . . , (v`−1, v`), (v`, i) of edges in the dependency graph. The existence of dependency
loops is important: If node i has no dependency loops, then the cooperation level chosen by i in a given
time slot has no effect on the normalized throughput experienced by i in future time slots.
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We define two types of dependency loops depending on the strategies played by the nodes on the
dependency loop. If all nodes j (where j 6= i) on the dependency loop of i play reactive strategies,
then we talk about a reactive dependency loop of i. If, on the other hand, there exists at least one node
j (where j 6= i) on the dependency loop of i that plays a non-reactive strategy, then the loop will be a
non-reactive dependency loop of i.
4 Results
Our goal, in this section, is to find possible Nash equilibria [Nash50] and investigate the conditions
for them. The existence of a Nash equilibrium based on cooperation would mean that there are cases
in which cooperation is “naturally” encouraged, meaning without using incentive mechanisms. In the
following, we use the model presented in Fig. 4. In Section 4.1, we present analytical results that
define the best strategies for a node under specific network conditions. In Section 4.2, we present the
results of simulations that we performed to estimate the probability that these conditions are satisfied
by the network.
4.1 Analytical Results
The aim of the nodes is to maximize the payoff that they accumulate over time. We compute this
cumulative payoff by applying the standard technique used in the theory of iterative games [Axe84]:
The cumulative payoff pii of a node i is computed as the weighted sum of the payoffs pii(t) that i
obtains in each time slot t:
pii =
∞∑
t=0
[pii(t) · ωt] (7)
where 0 < ω < 1, and hence, the weights exponentially decrease with t. The value ω is often called
the discounting factor, as it represents the degree to which the payoff of each time slot is discounted
relative to the previous time slot.
Recall that Si(t) denotes the set of routes where i is the source, and Fi(t) denotes the set of routes
where i is an intermediate node. Since we assumed that the routes remain static, Si(t) and Fi(t) do
not change in time, and we will simply write Si and Fi instead of Si(t) and Fi(t). In addition, since
we assumed that each node is source on exactly one route, Si is a singleton. We denote the single route
in Si by ri. The cardinality of Fi will be denoted by |Fi|. Let us assume that node i is an intermediate
node on route r. We denote the set of intermediate nodes on r upstream from node i including node
i in time slot t by Φ(r, i). If node i has a reactive dependency loop with some of its sources, then
we consider the shortest loop for each source. We denote the length of the longest of such reactive
dependency loops minus one by ∆i.
Theorem 1. If a node i does not have any dependency loops, then its best strategy is AllD (i.e., to
choose cooperation level 0 in every time slot).
Proof. Node i wants to maximize its cumulative payoff pii defined in (7). In our case, pii(t) can be
written as:
pii(t) = ξi(ri, t) +
∑
r∈Fi
ηi(r, t)
= [(G+ L) · yi(t)− L]− C ·
∑
r∈Fi
∏
k∈Φ(r,i)
xk(t)
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Given that i has no dependency loops, yi(t) is independent of all the previous cooperation levels of
node i. Thus, pii is maximized if xi(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Theorem 2. If a node i has only non-reactive dependency loops, then its best strategy is AllD.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. Since all dependency loops of i are non-
reactive, its experienced normalized throughput yi is independent of its own behavior xi. This implies
that its best strategy is not to forward.
Corollary 1. If every node j (j 6= i) plays AllD, then the best response of i to this is AllD. Hence,
every node playing AllD is a Nash equilibrium.
In order to illustrate the case in which some nodes have no dependency loops, we modify the
network of Fig. 1. In the modified network, shown in Fig. 5, nodes 2 and 5 have no dependency loops.
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Figure 5: A network with routes where nodes 2 and 5 have no dependency loops
If the conditions of Theorems 1 and 2 do not hold, then we could not determine the best strategy
of a node i in general, because it very much depends on the particular scenario (dependency graph) in
question and the strategies played by the other nodes. However, in certain cases, the best strategy can
be determined, as shown by the following theorem:
Theorem 3. The best strategy for node i is TFT, if:
1. Node i has a reactive dependency loop with at least one of its sources. In addition, for each of
its sources s, either node i has a reactive dependency loop with s or i is the first forwarder for
s,
2. every other node j (j 6= i) plays TFT, and
3. (G+ L) · ω∆i > |Fi| · C.
The expression (G+L) ·ω∆i > |Fi| ·C means that the possible benefit for node i must be greater
than its maximal forwarding cost considering every source node with which node i has a reactive
dependency loop.
We provide here an outline of the proof as follows. The complete proof is presented in the ap-
pendix. Considering any node i we introduce the first two conditions in the theorem to ensure that
the behavior of the node possibly affects itself. In the next step, we show that the behavior of the
9
node is an upper bound for its experienced normalized throughput in a given number of time slots.
We explicitly define this number. Then we give an upper bound for the total payoff of the node using
the previous idea of the behavior feedback. Finally, we show that the node playing TFT reaches the
maximum payoff defined by the upper bound.
Corollary 2. If Theorem 3 holds for every node, then all nodes playing TFT is a Nash equilibrium.
As an example, let us consider Fig. 1 again. If the third condition of Theorem 3 holds for each
node, then all nodes playing TFT is a Nash equilibrium for this network.
The first two theorems state that if the behavior of node i has no effect on its experienced nor-
malized throughput, then defection is the best choice for i. In addition, Corollary 1 says that if every
node defects constantly, it is a Nash equilibrium. The condition of Theorem 2 implies that it would
be a naı¨ve approach to program all devices with the strategy that always forwards (AllC), because this
would make the network exploitable by selfish participants. Instead, manufacturers should program a
reactive strategy into the devices. Theorem 3 and its corollary mentions the existence of a cooperative
equilibrium (each node playing TFT). Yet, the conditions for this existence are extremely stringent.
4.2 Simulation Results
In this subsection our goal is to determine the likelihood that a cooperative equilibrium exists (i.e.,
the conditions of Theorem 3 hold). To this end, we performed simulations in randomly generated
scenarios. We summarize the parameters in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameter values for the simulation
Parameter Value
Number of nodes 100
Area type Torus
Area size 1500 m2
Radio range 250 m
Route length 4 hops
In our simulations, we randomly placed nodes in a toroid3 area. Then, for each node, we randomly
chose a destination at a fixed distance (in hops) from the node and we determined a route to this
destination using any shortest path algorithm. If several routes existed, then we randomly chose a
single one. From the routes, we built up the dependency graph of the network. On this dependency
graph, we performed a search for reactive dependency loops while varying the fraction of nodes that
played non-reactive strategies. All the results presented in the following subsections are the mean
values of 100 simulations with a 95% confidence interval.
Figure 6 shows the proportion of nodes that (a) can play reactive strategies (i.e. are not pro-
grammed to play non-reactive strategies), (b) are forwarders at least on one route, (c) have at least one
reactive dependency loop and (d) fulfill the first condition of Theorem 3.
The nodes that cannot play reactive strategies are irrelevant to our investigations because they
follow a fixed packet forwarding strategy, thus they do not make a decision about packet forwarding
at all. Additionally, there is a fraction of nodes that are not forwarders in any of the routes, thus
3We used this area type to avoid border effects. In a realistic scenario, the toroid area can be considered as an inner part
of a large network.
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Figure 6: The proportion of nodes that (a) can play reactive strategies (i.e. are not programmed to
play non-reactive strategies), (b) are forwarders at least on one route, (c) have at least one reactive
dependency loop and (d) fulfill the first condition of Theorem 3
they have no effect on other nodes. The nodes in this situation are also irrelevant to our study. In
Fig. 7 we show the same results as in Fig. 6 excluding these two types of nodes. We can see that if
initially every node can play reactive strategy, the proportion of nodes that fulfill the first condition of
Theorem 3 is about 50 percent. This proportion decreases as we increase the proportion of nodes that
play constantly non-reactive strategies.
If there exists at least one node that needs an incentive mechanism to cooperate, then we say that
an incentive mechanism must be applied for the whole network. Since the proportion of such nodes is
always around or above 50 percent, we can conclude that in general an incentive mechanism is almost
always needed under the assumption we have considered.
5 Related work
Energy-efficient cooperation in ad hoc networks. Srinivasan et al. [SNCR03] provide a mathemat-
ical framework for cooperation in ad hoc networks, which focuses on the energy-efficient aspects of
cooperation. In their solution, the nodes are classified in different energy classes. The nodes differ-
entiate between the connections based on the energy classes of the participants and apply different
behavior according to the type of the connection. This framework relies on an ideal mechanism that
distributes class information. We introduce a game theoretic model that does not rely on an addi-
tional mechanism, thus our investigations are more generic. Similarly to our framework, Srinivasan
et al. define time slots as an operating unit. But, they generate only one communication session in
the network in each time slot. They choose the participating nodes for this session uniformly. In our
model we take the constitution of the network also into account, which is in our opinion an important
factor. Finally, we develop a model for the nodes where they can make decisions based only on local
information.
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Figure 7: The proportion of nodes (c) have at least one reactive dependency loop and (d) fulfill the
first condition of Theorem 3
Incentive mechanism in ad hoc networks. Marti et. al. [MGLB00] consider an ad hoc network
where some misbehaving nodes agree to forward packets but then fail to do so. They propose a
mechanism, called watchdog, in charge of identifying the misbehaving nodes, and a mechanism,
called pathrater, that deflects the traffic around them. But, misbehaving nodes are not punished,
and thus there is no motivation for the nodes to cooperate. To overcome this problem, Buchegger
and Le Boudec [BL02] and also Michiardi and Molva [MM02] define protocols that are based on a
reputation system. In both approaches, the nodes observe the behavior of each other and store this
knowledge locally. Additionally, they distribute this information in reputation reports. According to
their observations, the nodes decide how to behave with each other (e.g., nodes may deny forwarding
packets for misbehaving nodes). Another solution presented by Buttyan and Hubaux [BH00, BH03]
that gives an incentive for cooperation is based on a virtual currency, called nuglets or credits: If a
node wants to send its own packets, it has to pay for it in credits, whereas if the node forwards a packet
for the benefit of another node, it is rewarded with credits.
Application of game theory to networking. Game theory has been used to solve problems both
in fixed and cellular networks. Ji and Huang [JH98] apply the game theory for uplink power con-
trol in cellular networks. In [XSC01], Xiao et.al. describe an utility-based power control framework
for a cellular system. In [GM01], Goodman and Mandayam introduce the concept of network as-
sisted power control to equalize signal-to-interference ratio between the users. Korilis et.al. [KLO95]
address the problem of allocating link capacities at routing decisions. In [KO99], they suggest a
congestion-based pricing scheme. Roughgarden [Rou02] quantifies the worst-possible loss in net-
work performance arising from non-cooperative routing behavior. In [YMR00], Yaı¨che et.al. present
a game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation. They study the centralized problem and show
that the solution can be distributed in a way that leads to a system-wide optimum. Marbach [Mar01]
applies the game theory for pricing in differentiated services networks.
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Cooperation studies in other areas of science. The emergence of cooperation has also been stud-
ied in a biological [Daw76], a sociological [Ols65] and an economical [Sim55] context. Most of these
studies use the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game as their underlying model (see e.g., Axelrod
[Axe84, CRA99], Rapaport and Chammah [RC65] or Trivers [Tri71]). The simplicity of the IPD
makes it an attractive model, but it is not appropriate for modelling packet forwarding because it in-
volves only two players that, in addition, have symmetric roles. Consequently, in this paper, we define
a multi-player, asymmetric game that better suits our purposes. In [Axe84], Axelrod identifies Tit-
for-Tat (TFT) as a robust strategy that performs surprisingly well (in terms of maximizing the player’s
payoff) in many situations. TFT begins with cooperation in the first round and then repeats the pre-
vious move of the other player. Wahl and Nowak [WN99] study the Continuous valued Prisoner’s
Dilemma (CPD) game, where the nodes can choose a degree of cooperation between full cooperation
and full defection. Our model is, similarly to their model, based on a continuous valued game.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a theoretical framework to study the possible existence of cooperation
for packet forwarding in multi-hop wireless networks. We have introduced the concept of dependency
graphs, based on which we were able to prove several theorems. As a main result, we proved the
existence of a cooperative equilibrium of packet forwarding strategies. But, our simulation results
show that, in general, at most half of the nodes can have TFT as the best strategy. Thus, the likelihood
that the condition for Corollary 2 holds (i.e., every node has TFT as the best strategy) is extremely
small.
It is important to notice that our approach does not require a node to keep track of the individual
behavior of other nodes: indeed, the considered node is served simply in a way that reflects the way
it served others. As we have shown, this concept is captured by the game in which a given node
perceives itself as playing with the rest of the network. In this way, the node does not even need to
know the identity of the nodes forwarding (or deciding to not forward) its packets.
In this paper, we have assumed the routes to be static; this drastic decision was motivated by the
complexity of the problem and by our willingness to provide formal results. In terms of future work,
we intend to study the impact of mobility; we expect mobility to have beneficial effects, as it will
increase the dependency between the nodes. In this work, we focused on the possible existence of
equilibria; in the future, we will also investigate the possible emergence of such equilibria. Finally,
we intend to relax the assumption of linearity of the utility function.
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A Proof of Theorem 3
In this proof, we consider the total payoff for a given node i discounted with the factor ω in future
time slots. We give an upper bound for this value and show that if node i plays TFT, then it reaches
this upper bound. We conclude that TFT is the best possible strategy for node i.
Theorem 3. The best strategy for node i is TFT, if:
1. Node i has a reactive dependency loop with at least one of its sources. In addition, for each of
its sources s, either node i has a reactive dependency loop with s or i is the first forwarder for
s,
2. every other node j (j 6= i) plays TFT, and
3. (G+ L) · ω∆i > |Fi| · C.
Proof. Node i is an intermediate node on a given route r. src(r) stands for the source of this route.
We denote the set of intermediate nodes on r upstream from node i, including node i in time slot t
by Φ(r, i, t). Moreover, we denote by Φ(r, t) the set of all forwarder nodes on route r in time slot t.
Applying the notation of the meta-model, (1) can be written as follows:
ysrc(r)(t) =
∏
k∈Φ(r,t)
xk(t) (8)
Node i participates in several routes as a forwarder. According to the first condition of the theorem,
node i either has a reactive dependency loop with one of its sources or it is the first forwarder for that
source. Thus, we can split up the set of routes Fi into two subsets. The first subset, denoted by F
′
i ,
contains the routes where node i has a reactive dependency loop with the source. The second subset,
denoted by Fi\F ′i , contains the routes where node i is the first forwarder and is therefore the set .
For any r ∈ F ′i , we can give a lower bound for the cooperation level of node i as:
xi(t) ≥
∏
k∈Φ(r,i,t)
xk(t)
1)
≥
∏
k∈Φ(r,t)
xk(t)
2)
= ysrc(r)(t)
3)
≥ yi(t+ δi,src(r)) (9)
1) This means that we give a lower bound for the cooperation level of some nodes on route r with the product of all nodes
on route r.
2) Using (8).
3) The inequality holds, because every node is playing TFT (the identity function in Table 1), so the t-th i/o formula that
gives the value of ysrc(r)(t) is a product that involves yi(t+ δi,src(r)).
For the routes where node i is the first forwarder, we have:∏
k∈Φ(r,i,t)
xk(t) = xi(t) (10)
because Φ(r, i, t) is reduced to the singleton {i}.
Beginning from (5) we express the total payoff of node i over all time slots t (pii) as:
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pii = G+ C (11)
=
∞∑
t=0
∑
r∈Si(t)
ξi(r, t)ωt +
∞∑
t=0
∑
r∈Fi(t)
ηi(r, t)ωt
where the first term represents the total gain for node i (shortly G) and the second term stands for
its total cost (C).
Let us give an upper bound for the total gain first:
G =
∞∑
t=0
[((G+ L) · yi(t)− L)ωt]
= (G+ L)
∞∑
t=0
yi(t)ωt − L
∞∑
t=0
ωt
1)
=
|F ′i |
|Fi| · (G+ L) ·
∞∑
t=0
yi(t) · ωt + |Fi\F
′
i |
|Fi| · (G+ L) ·
∞∑
t=0
yi(t) · ωt − L1− ω
2)
=
∑
rp∈F ′i
G+ L
|Fi| · (
δi,src(rp)−1∑
t=0
yi(t) · ωt +
∞∑
t=δi,src(rp)
yi(t) · ωt)
+
|Fi\F ′i |
|Fi| · (G+ L) ·
∞∑
t=0
yi(t) · ωt − L1− ω
3)
=
∑
rp∈F ′i
G+ L
|Fi| · (
δi,src(rp)−1∑
t=0
yi(t) · ωt +
∞∑
t=δi,src(rp)
yi(t) · ωt)
+|Fi\F ′i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| · (
∆i−1∑
t=0
yi(t) · ωt +
∞∑
t=∆i
yi(t) · ωt)− L1− ω
4)
=
∑
rp∈F ′i
G+ L
|Fi| · (
δi,src(rp)−1∑
t=0
yi(t) · ωt + ωδi,src(rp) ·
∞∑
t=0
yi(t+ δi,src(rp)) · ωt)
+|Fi\F ′i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| · (
∆i−1∑
t=0
yi(t) · ωt + ω∆i ·
∞∑
t=0
yi(t+∆i) · ωt)− L1− ω
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5)
≤
∑
rp∈F ′i
G+ L
|Fi| · (
δi,src(rp)−1∑
t=0
yi(t) · ωt + ωδi,src(rp) ·
∞∑
t=0
yi(t+ δi,src(rp)) · ωt)
+|Fi\F ′i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| · (
∆i−1∑
t=0
yi(t) · ωt + ω∆i ·
∞∑
t=0
xi(t) · ωt)− L1− ω
=
∑
rp∈F ′i
(
G+ L
|Fi| ·
δi,src(rp)−1∑
t=0
yi(t) · ωt) +
∑
rp∈F ′i
(
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
δi,src(rp) ·
∞∑
t=0
yi(t+ δi,src(rp)) · ωt)
+|Fi\F ′i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| ·
∆i−1∑
t=0
yi(t) · ωt + |Fi\F ′i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
∆i ·
∞∑
t=0
xi(t) · ωt − L1− ω
6)
≤
∑
rp∈F ′i
(
G+ L
|Fi| ·
δi,src(rp)−1∑
t=0
ωt) +
∑
rp∈F ′i
(
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
δi,src(rp) ·
∞∑
t=0
yi(t+ δi,src(rp)) · ωt)
+|Fi\F ′i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| ·
∆i−1∑
t=0
ωt + |Fi\F ′i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
∆i ·
∞∑
t=0
xi(t) · ωt − L1− ω
=
∑
rp∈F ′i
(
G+ L
|Fi| ·
1− ωδi,src(rp)
1− ω ) +
∑
rp∈F ′i
(
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
δi,src(rp) ·
∞∑
t=0
yi(t+ δi,src(rp)) · ωt)
+|Fi\F ′i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| ·
1− ω∆i
1− ω + |Fi\F
′
i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
∆i ·
∞∑
t=0
xi(t) · ωt − L1− ω
1) We split up the first term into two parts according to the sets F ′i and Fi\F
′
i . We know that |F
′
i |+ |Fi\F
′
i | = |Fi|.
2) We replace the multiplication with F ′i with the sum over all rp ∈ F
′
i . Additionally, we rewrite the first term in a way
that the infinite sum is split up into two parts. Recall that δi,src(rp) stands for the shortest reactive dependency loop
minus one for node i with its source src(rp).
3) Now we split up the term that corresponds to the remaining set of routes (Fi\F ′i ). Here ∆i is the largest of all δi,src(rp),
where rp ∈ F ′i .
4) Changing the index in both first and second term.
5) Using (9) we can give an upper bound.
6) Using that yi(t) ≤ 1.
Now let us give an upper bound for the total cost (C):
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C = −C ·
∞∑
t=0
∑
r∈Fi
∏
k∈Φ(r,i,t)
xk(t) · ωt
1)
= −C ·
∑
rp∈F ′i
∞∑
t=0
∏
k∈Φ(r,i,t)
xk(t) · ωt − C ·
∑
rq∈Fi\F ′i
∞∑
t=0
∏
k∈Φ(r,i,t)
xk(t) · ωt
2)
≤ −C ·
∑
rp∈F ′i
∞∑
t=0
yi(t+ δi,src(rp)) · ωt − C ·
∑
rq∈Fi\F ′i
∞∑
t=0
xi(t) · ωt
3)
= −C ·
∑
rp∈F ′i
∞∑
t=0
yi(t+ δi,src(rp)) · ωt − C · |Fi\F
′
i | ·
∞∑
t=0
xi(t) · ωt
1) We can split up the cost over all routes as a cost over the sets of routes in F ′i and Fi\F
′
i , respectively.
2) Using (9) and (10) we can give an upper bound.
3) In the second term the sum is independent of rq .
Now we reexpress (11) by including the values we have just completed for G and C:
pii ≤
∑
rp∈F ′i
(
G+ L
|Fi| ·
1− ωδi,src(rp)
1− ω ) +
∑
rp∈F ′i
(
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
δi,src(rp) ·
∞∑
t=0
yi(t+ δi,src(rp)) · ωt)
+|Fi\F ′i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| ·
1− ω∆i
1− ω + |Fi\F
′
i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
∆i ·
∞∑
t=0
xi(t) · ωt − L1− ω
−C ·
∑
rp∈F ′i
∞∑
t=0
yi(t+ δi,src(rp)) · ωt − C · |Fi\F
′
i | ·
∞∑
t=0
xi(t) · ωt
=
∑
rp∈F ′i
(
G+ L
|Fi| ·
1− ωδi,src(rp)
1− ω ) + |Fi\F
′
i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| ·
1− ω∆i
1− ω −
L
1− ω
+
∑
rp∈F ′i
((
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
δi,src(rp) − C) ·
∞∑
t=0
yi(t+ δi,src(rp)) · ωt)
+|Fi\F ′i | · (
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
∆i − C) ·
∞∑
t=0
xi(t) · ωt
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1)
≤
∑
rp∈F ′i
(
G+ L
|Fi| ·
1− ωδi,src(rp)
1− ω ) + |Fi\F
′
i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| ·
1− ω∆i
1− ω −
L
1− ω
+
∑
rp∈F ′i
((
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
δi,src(rp) − C) ·
∞∑
t=0
ωt)
+|Fi\F ′i | · (
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
∆i − C) ·
∞∑
t=0
ωt
=
∑
rp∈F ′i
(
G+ L
|Fi| ·
1− ωδi,src(rp)
1− ω ) + |Fi\F
′
i | ·
G+ L
|Fi| ·
1− ω∆i
1− ω −
L
1− ω
+
∑
rp∈F ′i
((
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
δi,src(rp) − C) · 1
1− ω )
+|Fi\F ′i | · (
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
∆i − C) · 1
1− ω
=
∑
rp∈F ′i
(
G+ L
|Fi| − C) ·
1
1− ω + |Fi\F
′
i | · (
G+ L
|Fi| − C) ·
1
1− ω −
L
1− ω
2)
= |F ′i | · (
G+ L
|Fi| − C) ·
1
1− ω + |Fi\F
′
i | · (
G+ L
|Fi| − C) ·
1
1− ω −
L
1− ω
3)
= (G+ L− |Fi| · C) · 11− ω −
L
1− ω
=
G− |Fi| · C
1− ω
1) The inequality holds if for all routes rp, where rp ∈ F ′i the following condition is true:
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
δi,src(rp) − C > 0
G+ L
|Fi| · ω
δi,src(rp) > C
(G+ L) · ωδi,src(rp) > C · |Fi|
Recall from the theorem that ∆i is largest among all δi,src(rp). If the condition is true for this value then it is true for
all δi,src(rp). Thus, the condition for ∆i is the third condition for the theorem.
If the condition is true, we can give an upper bound if we substitute yi(t + δi,src(rp)) and xi(t) by 1 (in the last two
terms).
2) The first sum is independent of rp.
3) Recall that |F ′i |+ |Fi\F
′
i | = |Fi|.
Let us emphasize the upper bound for the total payoff again:
pii ≤ G− |Fi| · C1− ω (12)
If node i plays the strategy TFT as the others do, then everyone cooperates. In this case,
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pii =
∞∑
t=0
[[(G+ L) · yi(t)− L− C ·
∑
r∈Fi
∏
k∈Φ(r,i,t)
xk(t)]ωt]
=
∞∑
t=0
[(G− C|Fi|) · ωt]
=
G− |Fi| · C
1− ω
This value is equal to the upper bound expressed in (12), meaning that there is no strategy for
node i leading to a higher payoff than TFT. Therefore, TFT is the best strategy for node i.
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